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Die Idee sitzt gleichsam als Brille auf unsrer Nase, und was wir ansehen, sehen wir 
durch sie. Wir kommen gar nicht auf den Gedanken, die Brille abzunehmen. 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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Introduction 
It must have been around six months ago that I was taking a stroll through my neighbourhood, 
when I saw a crayon drawing on the sidewalk straight in front of a house. The drawing 
depicted a child with a smartphone, making a selfie. Under the drawing there was a caption: 
‘Vind je deze tekening leuk? Druk op de deurbel’ (‘Do you like this drawing? Press the 
doorbell’ ). Children asking for a resemblance of a Facebook ‘like’ in a street-playing setting: 
it was one of the instances that made me realise that the way in which we communicate on 
social media is pervading our ‘offline’ lives. Social Network Services1 (SNS’s), more 
commonly known as social media, have pervaded the western societies in record speed. New 
generations grow up with them: many young children can swipe before they can speak. And it 
is not just the youngest who are online; all generations are represented on SNS’s. Social 
media are influential. In the governmental elections in the US (2016), the Netherlands and 
France (2017), Twitter and other SNS’s had a large impact on the campaigns, the voting 
turnout and the election outcomes. Politicians use SNS’s, like Twitter, to make their ideas and 
views known to the public. Many types of behaviour have changed quite radically since the 
emergence of SNS’s. Social media have changed the ways in which people can communicate 
as well as the content of their communications. The changes are interesting and can be studied 
in different ways: in social and linguistic studies, for instance, and in media and technology 
studies. But what about philosophy? Is the rapid emergence of SNS’s philosophically 
relevant? I believe that it is. I will argue in this thesis that SNS’s have created a new type of 
speech act: the meta-speech act. The view that I will defend is that this is a new speech act, 
particular for social media. I will show that it is new by proving that it does not fit into any 
                                                          
1 The term SNS is borrowed from the computational academic field and applies to for all online social networks 
services, including but not limited to: Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, Pinterest, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, blog websites and vlog websites. 
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existing categorisations of speech acts within speech act theory as coined by J.L. Austin and 
further developed by John Searle. Their taxonomies are not comprehensive enough to include 
all possible speech acts on SNS’s. 
The first step in any research project is to study published literature on the topic in 
question. I found out that to date, there is almost no literature on SNS’s and speech acts in 
philosophy of language.2 This means I need to incorporate some basic groundwork this thesis, 
since I cannot refer to other works and build upon those. A drawback of this approach, which 
exists of ranking speech acts on SNS’s in existing speech act taxonomies, is that the 
enumeration part does not have much philosophical depth. I try to make up for this by an 
extra focus on the (analytical) philosophical aspects of this thesis, for instance by specifying 
the different philosophical terms and exploring relevant connections with existing debates in 
philosophy of language. This means the thesis contains some side steps with a relevance to 
the subject at hand. 
One of the goals of my thesis is to make the first link between existing speech act 
theory and speech acts on SNS’s. I took it upon me to list all the possible speech acts on 
Facebook and Twitter (which I have chosen as representatives of SNS’s) and categorised them 
in the existing taxonomies of illocutionary acts by Austin and Searle. In doing so, it became 
clear that a very common and frequently performed speech act on SNS’s does not fit the 
mould and is new in two ways: it has no counterpart in real life3 and it has no place in either 
of Austin’s and Searle’s taxonomies.4 The new speech act I am referring to is hashtagging. To 
                                                          
2 There is literature on SNS’s in other academic fields, among which are social studies, linguistics and 
computational studies. Some of these mention speech act theory, however they do not refer to the 
philosophical understanding of this theory; they refer to the linguistic understanding. 
3 Throughout this thesis, I will use the phrase ‘in real life’ for the situations in which people can verbally 
exchange language, for example in conversations in person or by telephone. ‘In real life’ is synonym with ‘not 
online’ or ‘offline’. 
4 Austin: How to do things with words, 1962; Searle: A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 1976 
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hashtag is to give one’s speech a tag, like a label, in order to make it easier for other people to 
find it. In that sense, it is comparable to everyone becoming their own librarian, putting tags 
on their online utterances, so that readers are able to look them up with search terms matching 
the tags. But there is more. Hashtags are not only search helps, they are also names, and ways 
to mix into a community. And, finally, the most striking feature of this speech act is that it is 
used to do something with another speech act – it is a meta-speech act. This type of act is 
specific to SNS’s and raises several questions that form the heart of this thesis. What kind of 
speech act is hashtagging? What is so different about this act compared to other speech acts 
on SNS’s, which (as will become clear from my enumeration) almost all fit in the, apparently 
still very topical, existing speech act taxonomies? And even if we grant that hashtagging is a 
new speech act, why is this philosophically relevant? All these questions will be discussed in 
chapter 3. 
This paper is structured as follows. In chapter 1, I will first address the question 
whether or not acts on SNS’s are speech acts. I believe that they are. Austin provides 
background on why his speech act theory pertains to both verbal and written speech. I will 
defend this view in discussing Barry Smith’s argumentation that written speech results in 
document acts, which, in his opinion, take speech acts to a new level. Document acts are new 
things one can do with words beyond regular speech. (Smith discussed these as part of a 
discussion on social ontology.) If Smith is right, then the predominantly written speech on 
SNS’s might be document acts and not speech acts. I argue against this point of view. In 
paragraph 1.2 I discuss Internet availability, since it might be argued that if only a minority 
has access to SNS’s, the acts on them are not as omnipresent as offline speech and could 
therefore be an exception to speech act theory. The third paragraph of this chapter is dedicated 
to a definition of illocutionary act. I will also address some problems with the terms used in 
speech act theory and discuss the product-act distinction of illocutionary acts. Chapter 2 is the 
6 
 
chapter in which I first list and assess SNS’s speech acts in their relation to the existing 
illocutionary act taxonomies. I will start by briefly discussing illocutionary acts on Facebook 
and Twitter and introducing the speech act taxonomies of Austin and Searle, followed by the 
actual categorisation of the different illocutionary acts. At the end of the chapter, I give an 
overview of these. The third and final chapter is dedicated to the hashtag. I discuss its uses 
and what kind of speech act it is. Next, I discuss two possible characterisations for the 
illocutionary act of hashtagging: as a family resemblance term, and as a meta-speech act. I 
will argue for the latter. 
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Chapter 1: Illocutionary acts online 
Introduction 
Before introducing my arguments, I need to clarify some terms I will use throughout this 
thesis. In offline speech, words and sentences are audible and there is not always a need to 
record them. I contrast offline speech with online speech. Offline speech is verbal, audible 
speech such as is used in common everyday communication. Examples of offline speech are 
conversing and delivering a speech. I regard it speech when the person doing the speaking, 
speaks out loud. For something to be speech, it is not necessary that there be an audience or 
‘uptake’, in Austin’s terms. Note that this applies to speech as such, not to speech acts. Online 
speech is speech that is uttered via computer mediation. Examples of online speech are e-
mails, status updates and other communication on SNS’s, blogs and vlogs.5  
 The word ‘speech’ can designate many different things. For instance, ‘speech’ includes 
uttering a single word like ‘cat’; it includes uttering (meaningful) sentences on a stage during 
a play; it includes euphemisms, metaphors and ironic utterances. The main point of my thesis, 
that there are new speech acts as a result of the existence of social media, will come across 
most clearly when I restrict the term ‘utterance’ to what Searle calls “serious literal 
utterances”. 6 The ‘serious literal utterance’ contrasts serious utterances with play-acting, 
teaching a language, reciting poems, practicing pronunciation, etc., and contrasts literal with 
metaphorical, sarcastic, etc.. So, for instance, if John utters the following sentence directed at 
Peter: ‘I will be at your party tomorrow’, and it is a serious literal utterance by John, then 
                                                          
5 A blog is a diary entry posted on a website or an SNS. Examples are philosophy blogs featuring philosophical 
topics (e.g. http://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/) and food blogs featuring information about food and 
recipes. A vlog is a spoken diary entry that is digitally recorded and uploaded to a website or an SNS such as 
YouTube or Vimeo. Examples are fitness vlogs in which people share their view on training and nutrition, and 
personal vlogs by well-known (‘famous’) people (e.g. the vlogs of philosopher Jason Silva: 
https://www.youtube.com/user/ShotsOfAwe/videos). By diary entry, I mean that the blogger or vlogger shares 
one (or more) topic per blog/vlog, making each blog similar to a ‘written article’ and a vlog to a ‘video message’.  
6 Searle, 1968, p, 406 
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Peter has justification for his belief that John will be at his party tomorrow. Because of the 
notion of serious literal utterance that is applicable to this thesis, I will be able to treat 
utterances on their face value and will not have to go into the sentence being uttered in jest, or 
ironically, or as a lie, for every example given.  
Finally, by ‘speech act’ I mean an intentional (serious literal) utterance with a performative 
function, meaning that in saying something, an act is performed. In the example of Peter and 
John, in saying ‘I will be at your party tomorrow’, John performs the act of promising Peter 
that he will attend his party.7 The performative function (or illocutionary force) of the 
utterance is to make a promise. I will go into more detail on the definition of speech acts and 
more specifically, illocutionary acts, in paragraph 1.1, but the term speech act will be used 
before then, so it had to be defined preliminarily here. 
 This chapter consists of three paragraphs. In the first paragraph, I discuss whether or 
not acts on SNS’s are speech acts. The second paragraph contains a discussion on internet 
penetration, since the number of people who are able to perform speech acts on SNS’s is 
relevant to the question of application of speech act theory to this domain. The third and last 
paragraph is dominated by a discussion of illocutionary acts, and is concerned with their 
definition and the distinction between the act and its product. 
 
1.1. Are acts on SNS’s speech acts? 
I argue that speech on SNS’s can contain speech acts. Am I justified in arguing that? Much of 
the speech on SNS’s is written speech. Does written speech differ from verbal speech with 
regards to speech act theory? Is written speech, perhaps, a physical act rather than a speech 
                                                          
7 One could take this utterance as a threat, as well, but again, I am assuming that utterances are serious and 
literal for the purpose of this thesis.  
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act? Or is it a document act, following Barry Smith’s theory?8 In the event that John had 
written down his utterance about attending Peter’s party, would this have been a speech act? I 
hold that written utterances qualify as speech and are subject to speech act theory. I am 
following John Austin in this perspective. In How to do things with words9, Austin did not 
differentiate between spoken and written language. Even though the terms he uses in laying 
out the speech act theory, such as ‘utterance’ and ‘speech’ may imply auditive language, it is 
not the case that the theory applies to spoken words alone. On three different occasions in 
Words, it becomes clear that Austin thought that his theory covered written utterances as well. 
His mentioning of written utterances is so casual, that I suspect he did not see how anyone 
could disagree: a speech act is a speech act, regardless of its mode of delivery. The first 
instance where Austin mentions written utterances acts is on page 8, where he states that 
performing an act can be done by uttering words ‘whether written or spoken’. The second 
mentioning of written utterances can be found on pages 60-61, where Austin speaks about 
connecting a speaker to written words ‘by appending his signature (this has to be done 
because, of course, written utterances are not tethered to their origin in the way spoken ones 
are).’ The part in parenthesis shows that written speech is different in the way it is tethered to 
its origin, but not in the sense that they are not utterances. The third occasion on which Austin 
mentions written speech is found on pages 74-75 and is regarding the different possible 
illocutionary forces of one single utterance. ‘It’s going to charge’, is the example Austin gives. 
This utterance can be taken up as a warning, a question or a protest (these are the different 
illocutionary forces). In verbal communication, we use tone of voice, cadence and emphasis 
to help convey our intention and hence help to communicate the illocutionary force. This is 
different in written language. In written texts we have to resort to punctuation like question 
                                                          
8 Smith, 2012; 2014 
9 Austin, 1962 
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marks, exclamation points and italics, but Austin finds these ‘rather crude’.10 (SNS’s have 
added possibilities for conveying intentions: emoji’s, see also 2.2). I concur with Austin’s 
view that written utterances can be speech acts just as spoken ones can be, and that includes 
written utterances on SNS’s. In fact, SNS’s only broaden the scope of things one can do with 
words in the same way that (analogue) documents already did, as noticed by Barry Smith. He 
proposes a document act theory in his publications How to do things with documents (2012) 
and Document acts (2104). Smith contends that speech acts exist only in their execution and 
are evanescent entities, as opposed to documents. A document is ‘something that is able to 
endure self-identically through time.’11 The same can be said about utterances on SNS’s. Once 
placed online, messages and images remain on the social medium. They can be deleted, of 
course, just as a paper document can be ripped up or shredded or burnt. However, it is very 
easy for other users of the SNS to share online messages and images – one mouse-click 
suffices – and once this process has begun, it is very difficult to retract them. The speaker may 
delete her message or post a new message saying that she retracts her words, but if it has been 
shared in the meantime, and if someone makes a screenshot of the message and posts, copying 
the message, then the words are out of the sphere of control of the original speaker. What 
Barry Smith argues about documents, could be argued about messages and images on SNS’s 
as well. So, what is his point of view? According to Smith, whereas speech acts begin and end 
                                                          
10 Over 50 years after Austin’s book was published, in 2015, the Oxford Dictionaries Word of the Year was an 
emoji called ‘face with tears of joy’. It was chosen as ‘the word that best reflected the ethos, mood and 
preoccupations of 2015’. Apparently, with the enormous growth of written communication in the digital era, 
some features of spoken language like tone of voice and emphasis were emphatically missed. This led first to 
smileys and later to all kinds of other face-like images to convey a certain tone of voice or intention to 
accompany a written utterance. I conclude from this that people still want their speech acts to come across as 
verbal speech acts, regardless of its being in written form. Emoji’s might have broadened the scope of the 
possible uptake of written messages with the readers, but I venture to say that Austin would still have found 
them ‘rather crude’. 
 
11 2012 p. 181 
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with the speaker and the hearer(s), there are more things you can do with words once they are 
printed (or written) on a document. Documents make it possible to do other, new things which 
you cannot do with verbal speech. For example, releasing funds and naming an heir are things 
you can do with documents, Smith contends. Documents also create new sorts of entities that 
make them part of social ontology. Smith describes social ontology as the theory of how 
entities that play a role in social life, come into existence. Banknotes and bonds are examples 
of resultants of speech acts: making a debt or a promise. Documents prolong speech acts. 
Smith holds that ‘the theory of speech acts provides what seems to be a satisfactory 
explanation of how entities such as debts or corporations or trusts begin to exist: (roughly) 
people make certain promises’.12 Speech acts create the beginning of document acts, but 
documents serve to prosthetically extend the mnemonic powers of individuals and, as such, 
create ‘novel artefacts of social reality’13. In other words, it is possible to do things with 
documents that you cannot do with speech, and this warrants the existence of a separate 
document act theory. Smith bases the need for a separate document act theory on three 
differences between speech and documents. The first difference is that speech acts are, in 
Smith’s terminology, ‘events/occurants’, whereas documents are ‘objects/continuants’ 
according to Smith. 14 These ‘continuants’ make a fleeting speech act continue further than the 
original utterance; a birth certificate containing the speech act of naming a new-born child and 
can be used as proof of one’s identity. In Smith’s view, use of that birth certificate to get a 
license of some sort, for instance, would be a document act. His view, summarised, is as 
follows. In the example of the birth certificate, first there is the speech act of naming. This 
speech act results in the child’s name (this could be called the ‘internal product’, but Smith 
                                                          
12 Smith 2014, p. 23 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
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does not say anything about this. I will, at the end of this paragraph.) For Smith, the document 
on which this name is then recorded, the birth certificate, is the continuant of the speech act. 
And since this continuant is a physical object, there are many more things you can do with it 
than just with the ‘event’ of the speech act. These physical objects, documents, are what Smith 
calls entities in social ontology. In our society, for some forms of social behaviour, such as 
getting a passport, buying a house or getting married, one needs a proof of one’s identity such 
as a birth certificate. The way our society is structured, demands that some original speech 
acts can endure through time. I do have some critical side notes to this line of arguing (and 
this pertains to the other arguments of Smith as well), but I will save these until after I have 
listed all three differences that Smith believes warrant a document act theory. The second 
difference according to Barry Smith is that documents form the basis for ‘new enduring 
dimensions of social reality’.15 On his view, documents create social entities, such as receipts, 
money and insurance policies. ‘The effect is that private memory traces inside human brains 
are prosthetically augmented by publicly accessible documents and associated document 
technologies’, Smith says.16 I understand Smith to hold here that the ‘internal product’ of the 
speech act, to which I will return shortly, is available more broadly in documents than when it 
is confined to the speech act of a speaker and her audience. If Anne gets prescribed medicines 
by her GP, then the doctor’s receipt will procure her medicines that she would not be able not 
get without the doctor’s speech act of prescribing. The document is the continuant that will 
convey the speech act of Anne’s GP to the pharmacist. The third and final of Smith’s 
differences is that ‘documents differ from speech acts also in the variety of ways in which 
pluralities of documents can be chained together (for example to form an audit trail), or 
combined to form new document-complexes whose structures mirror relations, for example of 
                                                          
15 Smith, 2014, p. 23 
16 Smith, 2014, p. 181 
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debtor to creditor, among the persons and institutions involved’.17 Putting documents together 
can result in new social artefacts, creating even more possibilities of things one can do with 
documents: they make possible new kinds of enduring social relations, changing 
socioeconomic reality. For instance, with criminal records, and bank accounts, and mortgage 
deeds. Smith even states that ‘the development of such artifacts [sic] and of the networks of 
social behavior and of claims and obligations with which they are associated is then in some 
ways analogous to the processes of biological evolution.’18 
 To me, it is obvious that Smith is right in stating that speech acts are fleeting and 
documents (or messages on SNS’s) have a more enduring character. However, I differ in 
opinion regarding the status of the things you can do with documents, or his document act 
theory. It is not what you can do with and/or to documents that creates new social artefacts, in 
my opinion. Speech acts create social artefacts and they can (or cannot) be recorded on 
documents. Every speech act results in a ‘product’, and it is this product that is recorded on a 
document. For instance, the speech act of promising results in a promise. This promise can be 
called the internal product of the speech act. And, following Smith’s terminology, I would 
argue that it is the internal products of speech acts that make up the social artefacts that 
change social relations and reality. As Van der Schaar points out, it was Kazimierz 
Twardowski who stated in his 1912 paper ‘Actions and Products’ that the distinction between 
actions and products does not just apply to the distinction between an action and the physical 
product that results from that action, such as composing music and the resulting work of 
music. The distinction applies to the mental realm as well; a mental action (or state) leads to a 
mental product. The act of thinking leads to a thought, and the act of judging leads to a 
judgement. Van der Schaar notes that the distinction applies to speech acts: there is the speech 
                                                          
17 Smith, 2014, p. 24 
18 Smit, 2012, p. 182 
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act and its resulting (internal) product.19 It is important to note that every illocutionary act 
results in a product. The act of asserting results in an assertion, the act of promising results in 
a promise, the act of marrying results in a marriage. These internal products are there, 
regardless of whether or not they are recorded (written down or typed). So, to be clear, there 
are: 
1. the (physical) illocutionary act of speaking (or writing);  
2. the non-physical internal product of the illocutionary act (this is non-physical even 
when it is written down!); 
3. possibly, a physical product – if and when the internal product is recorded. 
For example, making an assertion leads to the assertion made; and if it is recorded, then there 
is physical ‘evidence’ of that assertion. Writing down an assertion without verbally uttering it 
is still a combination of an illocutionary act, its internal product, and turning the internal 
product into something physical. This is because the internal product necessarily results from 
the illocutionary act.  
Another issue pointed out by Van der Schaar, is that the term assertion – like the term 
statement in Austin, and like all performative verbs – is ambiguous in the following way. ‘The 
term may either stand for the act of assertion or for the assertion made’.20 The assertion ‘the 
cat is on the mat’ is both a speech act and its product, the assertion. Austin’s first view was 
that in saying ‘the cat is on the mat’, no act is performed, and it is therefore not 
‘performative’. An assertion is an utterance that says something about the world as it is; it is a 
finding. That assertions are not performative was Austin’s original position. They fall within 
the true/false realm, and sentences within this realm Austin called constative, opposing them 
with performatives on the basis of the dimension of truth value: ‘I promise’ is neither true nor 
                                                          
19 Van der Schaar, 2015, p. 96-97 
20 Van der Schaar, 2011, p. 189 
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false. Rather, it is successful or unsuccessful (felicitous or infelicitous, in Austin’s terms). The 
performative/constative distinction fails, however, which is assented to by Austin in his later 
lectures in How to do things with words, and which is confirmed by others who have written 
about speech act theory, among whom Searle. The distinction fails because uttering ‘the cat is 
on the mat’ is equivalent to uttering ‘I state / assert / declare that the cat is on the mat’. And 
asserting, stating and declaring are performative verbs. Therefore, assertions, statements and 
declarations are speech acts. As we have seen, a difference can be made between the speech 
act itself and its result, the internal product, and this is exactly the point that Van der Schaar 
makes. The speech act of asserting is an act and is performative, but the internal product is the 
assertion made and this assertion has truth value, and is, in the earlier Austinian sense, 
constative.  
 Now it seems to me that what Smith is doing in his document theory, is ignoring the 
internal product of a speech act only recognising it when it is recorded on a document. What 
is recorded on the document, is the existing internal product of the speech act. The naming of 
a new-born is a speech act performed by the parents of the child. The child’s name is the 
internal product of this speech act. When this name is recorded by a local government official 
and put onto a birth certificate, then this would be the physical act of recording the name. This 
could be called a document act, but it is not the document that changes the world; it is not the 
document that gives the child its name. That is the exclusive preserve of the speech act and its 
resulting product. The child received its name upon the utterance of the speech act of naming, 
and not by putting the name on paper and/or storing the document in the municipal archives. 
So, Smith’s second difference between speech acts and document acts is not convincing to 
me, and neither is his third difference to warrant a document act theory: the fact that you can 
physically staple documents together. While it is true that you cannot physically staple verbal 
speech, the combining of documents as carriers of speech acts is nothing more than the 
16 
 
combining of the internal product of speech acts that are recorded on paper. In my view, the 
possibility of saying things in different modes, whether verbally, written of electronically, is 
not enough reason to state that in every different mode, there is a need for a new sort of ‘act 
theory’. The mode of delivery of a speech act does not make it a different sort of act. It 
remains a speech act. Therefore, I will adhere to my belief that speech act theory, not 
document act theory, pertains to speech acts on SNS’s. This is also important because it is the 
reason why I do not argue for a separate SNS act theory. It would be an option to separate 
online speech from offline speech and create a different speech act theory for online speech, 
much in the same way as Barry Smith has done with his document act theory. When in reality, 
online and offline speech are very similar – even if the consequences of online speech acts are 
bigger, or different, from those of offline speech acts. In my view, the mode of delivery of 
speech is in itself not enough to warrant a new type of ‘act theory’.  
There is one more type of speech that needs to be addressed when talking about 
SNS’s: images and videos (with or without speech). Some SNS’s, Instagram and YouTube 
being the most well-known and popular, have as an explicit purpose to share visual content; 
photos in the case of Instagram, videos in the case of YouTube. Are these speech? And can 
they be used to perform speech acts? The question of imagery and its rating as speech is 
discussed elaborately in the discussion on illocutionary acts in pornography, argued by, among 
others, Rae Langton and Nancy Bauer.21 In this literature, it is argued that imagery, including 
pornographic imagery, is speech, since 1) it carries illocutionary force, the proof of which is 
that there can be no doubt about the meaning of the imagery (illocutionary force is defined as 
‘meaning’ in this argument), and 2) imagery counts as speech when there is uptake (and there 
is, considering its large audience worldwide). Pornographic imagery consists mostly of 
                                                          
21 For further reading: Bauer, N., 2006. How to do things with pornography, in Reading Cavell, edited by S. Shieh 
and A. Crary. New York: Routledge, 68 – 97; Langton, R., 1993. Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 22, 293 – 330. 
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photographs and films, but imagery may also include paintings or sculptures, and if they meet 
conditions 1) and 2), these count as speech as well, according to the view of the authors 
mentioned above. In a televised interview with John Searle by prof. Bryan Magee, Searle 
explicitly included imagery (paintings) as speech acts with illocutionary force.22 However, for 
the purpose of this thesis, it is not necessary to take a standpoint on whether or not pure 
imagery is speech. I include videos with spoken or written words as speech. The reason to 
include written speech is, hopefully, clear by now; the reason to include videos that include 
speech is that there is no question that offline speech is speech, and so online speech is speech 
as well. It is the difference between an inaugural lecture being uttered in the privacy of the 
home as a rehearsal; the same lecture being uttered in an actual inaugural ceremony and the 
lecture being recorded on video and uploaded unto YouTube. These are not all different 
lectures that need their own lecture theory; it is one lecture that has different modes of 
delivery, but that is subject to one speech act theory. So, let us now go into this theory deeper 
and explore the connection between speech acts and illocutionary acts. 
 
1.2 Illocutionary acts, speech acts and performative verbs – a further look 
What is the relationship between a speech act and an illocutionary act? So far, I have only 
defined the term speech act preliminarily at the beginning of this chapter. Since the main 
question of my research is whether there exist new illocutionary acts that can only be 
performed on SNS’s, it is necessary to further explore the term ‘illocutionary act’. Since the 
illocutionary act is a part of a broader speech act theory, I will touch on other speech acts as 
well, and explore several problems and ambiguities in J.L. Austin’s original work that have 
been discussed in the literature on speech act theory.  
                                                          
22 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGKaBUWrWwE: 32:58 – 34:24 mins 
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 Let me begin by noting that speech act theory is about recognising that words can do 
things besides inform or convey information. It is a theory about things you can do with 
words within a certain conventional context, meaning a context in which certain rules are in 
place. These rules need to be in place for an illocutionary act to be successful or felicitous. 
For instance, uttering ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony will not be felicitous if the person 
speaking is already married. An illocutionary act is performed when something can be 
accomplished with speech that changes the status of the world. It is through speech that 
people can get married, make a promise or name a child. Actually doing something with 
words is at the heart of the theory of speech acts. Now, there are different things one can do 
with words. At the basic level, one can utter words. If these words are comprehensible, then 
the mere uttering of the words constitutes a locutionary act. The locutionary act is literally the 
act of speaking; it is the act of saying something in the ‘full normal sense’.23 But then, 
according to Austin, there are two more types of acts in which speech acts can be subdivided. 
The act on which I focus in this thesis, the illocutionary act, is the combination of three 
aspects: 
1. it is a (serious, literal) utterance that has a certain (propositional) content, and 
2. it is said in a certain context, i.e. a conventional environment, and 
3. it has a certain illocutionary force.  
The words ‘open the window, please’, when they are an utterance conforming to (1), have the 
content ‘to open the window’. (2) Within the right context, i.e. when I utter these words in a 
room, to another person, who understands English and can hear me, they can be taken up by 
the other person in the sense that she can understand the content and the illocutionary force of 
the words. The illocutionary force of the words depends on whether the words are uttered as a 
question, a plea, or an order. The utterance ‘open the window’ can be used with several 
                                                          
23 Austin, 1962, p. 94 
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different illocutionary forces, especially if we can change the order of the words. In addition 
to the illocutionary acts already mentioned (question, plea, order), they could form other 
illocutionary acts as well: an assertion, a guess, a promise, a suggestion, a vow, and so on. So, 
one single utterance can be used with many different illocutionary forces. And, finally, the 
third type of act Austin distinguishes is the perlocutionary act: the effect one’s words have on 
the hearer(s). Words can, for instance, convince, annoy, or bore them. This effect – whether or 
not intended by the speaker – Austin called perlocutionary. It is the act that follows an 
illocutionary act, as a result of the illocutionary act. Now, the illocutionary acts that are most 
easily recognisable contain verbs that, when uttered in the first person singular, present tense, 
constitute the performance of an act: performative verbs. Austin called them explicit 
performative verbs.24 A performative verb may be ‘used to effect what it signifies’.25 
Examples of performative verbs are promise, reckon, estimate, beg, apologise, agree, and ask 
– to give only a few. To see whether or not a verb is performative, a provisional litmus test26 
would be to inject the word hereby when it is used in the first person singular, present tense: ‘I 
hereby name this ship…’ ‘I hereby promise…’. It is of these explicit performative verbs that 
both Austin and Searle have made taxonomies in their quest for clarification of the different 
illocutionary acts. In this thesis, I am also concerned with illocutionary acts on SNS’s. That is 
why in chapter 2, I will dissect the illocutionary acts on SNS’s that are different from 
illocutionary acts in real life, and assess whether or not they are new illocutionary acts. This 
will reveal that most of the illocutionary acts on SNS’s are subject to the existing taxonomies 
of Austin and Searle. As we saw before, all illocutionary acts are speech acts, but not all 
speech acts are illocutionary acts: there are locutionary acts (the utterance itself) and 
                                                          
24 Austin, 1962, p. 149 
25 Van der Schaar, 2011, p. 190 
26 This litmus test is far from full proof, and I will discuss it in chapter 3, when I give my argument why ‘to 
hashtag’ is a new illocutionary act.  
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perlocutionary acts (the effects) as well. Speech acts can be illocutionary acts even when they 
do not contain performative verbs; a sentence can be performative without a performative 
verb.  
 The last item that needs to be addressed regarding illocutionary acts is whether these 
can be performed online. I have already made the argument that speech act theory holds for 
all speech acts, regardless of their mode of delivery. This includes their delivery on SNS’s. It 
is possible to make promises, ask questions, give judgements, and so on, online. Instagram 
and Pinterest are a bit different since a status update on these SNS’s requires an image, but 
still, anything can be posted. Just as offline, there are rules on SNS’s regarding hate speech, 
discrimination, racism, pornography, and so on, and libel and slander are punishable under the 
law. (The fact that utterances on SNS’s are actionable, just as verbal or otherwise written 
speech, also implies that there is no difference between speech acts on SNS’s and offline 
speech acts.) Just as in real life, a mixture of speech acts can be found on SNS’s. The fact that 
these utterances are typed and that some physical activity is necessary to post them – pressing 
buttons and clicking with the mouse or pressing enter – does not alter this. Uttering a sentence 
verbally requires some physical activity as well, after all.  
  
1.3 Can everyone perform speech acts on SNS’s, and is this relevant to research on 
speech act theory and SNS’s? 
The last important issue about posting on SNS’s that I will discuss here, before categorising 
speech acts on SNS’s, is the fact that not everyone can do it. To be able to perform speech 
acts, people need a voice, a mouth, muscles, and they need to know a language, but other than 
that, verbal speech is simply a matter of uttering words. To be able to post something on a 
social medium, for instance on Twitter, one additionally needs access to a device with an 
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internet connection and the Twitter application, plus a Twitter account.27 This already is a high 
demand: smartphones, laptops, tablets and computers are relatively expensive and in some 
parts of the world, hard to obtain. Add to this the fact slightly over half of the world 
population has access to the internet28 (51%), and one could argue that these requirements are 
pre-conditions that make SNS’s a different sort of speech environment that is not similar to 
the speech environment Austin and Searle were writing about, i.e. everyday speech interaction 
such as encountered in normal, everyday life. I maintain that while it is true that a social 
medium is a different sort of speech environment, four reasons make it plausible that SNS’s 
can be compared with ‘normal’ situations with regards to speech acts.  
1. In some parts of the world, known as the western countries, internet is available to the 
vast majority of people. 
2. It is not a necessary condition for a speech act to have the potential to reach everyone. 
3. There are also people who cannot perform offline speech acts, for instance people with 
speech impediments. 
4. A telling sign that SNS’s are a speech act platform, is that they are conventional 
surroundings. 
Ad 1. Internet availability varies greatly per continent. Even though the average is less than 
fifty percent, the percentages in the parts of the world better known as the ‘western’ world are 
much higher: North-America (88.1%), Europe (79.1%) and Oceania/Australia (69.6%)29. In 
these parts of the world many people can perform online speech acts.  
Ad 2. An utterance does not have to have the potential to reach the whole world for it to be a 
speech act. When I utter ‘I promise to make supper tonight’, with only my husband in the 
                                                          
27 Note that for some people, it is easier to speak online than offline; people with speech impediments, for 
instance, or people who are extremely shy. 
28 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm, date of verification: August 31, 2017, date of data: Q2 2017 
29 Source percentages: see note 29 
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vicinity, the reach of my speech act is limited, but it is valid as a speech act nonetheless. A 
Tweet not reaching certain people for lack of internet access is similar to the speech act 
performed in my living room not reaching them for lack of being in my living room. If 
anything, it is the other way around: one Tweet can reach the whole Twitter community much 
easier and faster than any other method of communication could. Ad 3. There are people who 
cannot perform speech acts offline: young children, people with speech impediments or 
disabilities like deafness and muteness, and people with certain psychological problems. The 
fact that not one hundred percent of people can perform an online speech act, likewise does 
not entail that speech act theory does not hold, since speech act theory is generally accepted in 
spite of the fact that not everyone can speak as a result of speech impediments.  
Ad 4. Austin’s illocutionary acts require conventional surroundings in order to be felicitous. 
For example, the christening of a ship is brought off well iff performed by the right person 
who is following the right procedures and performing the appropriate speech acts. In cultures 
where there is no such thing as ship christening, however, this process would be meaningless. 
Conventional surroundings, therefore, are at least partly culturally and regionally determined. 
Conventional here means: within a certain context and according to certain rules. An example 
will elucidate this; the example is borrowed from Austin,30 and it is the utterance ‘I divorce 
you’. In some countries with Islamic law, a husband’s triple consecutive uttering of the 
sentence ‘I divorce you’ equals the act of divorcing.31 When these utterances are complete, a 
divorce has been accomplished. The same utterances would not constitute a divorce for the 
wives of these Islamic husbands or for Christian spouses in say, France or Switzerland. Of 
course, circumstances matter: there must be uptake of the utterances, the Islamic husband 
uttering them has to be married, etcetera. This is what Austin calls a conventional surrounding 
                                                          
30 Austin, 1962, p. 27 
31 A wife cannot do this; it is a male privilege.  
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that is needed for the speech act of divorce in this example to be felicitous. The best way to 
see if convention is in play, is to ask whether one utterance would be able to yield the same 
results under different circumstances. If I walk out onto the street, go up to another person and 
utter the words: ‘I do’, then this will not lead to marriage. If I utter the exact same words 
during a marriage ceremony, to a person who is not already married, in front of a person with 
the power vested in her to marry people, then the result of the very same utterance will lead to 
my being married. The ceremony of marriage, including all the right people and institutions, 
is a conventional surrounding. In the same sense, SNS’s are examples of conventional 
surroundings. Most speech acts that you can perform on SNS’s will not yield the same result 
in other circumstances. For instance, all SNS’s offer the possibility of sharing (some SNS’s 
have different names for the same act: sharing on Facebook, retweeting on Twitter, and so on). 
Sharing someone else’s status update (for instance a link to a website or a video) is very 
common on SNS’s. It has the function of conveying that you think someone has posted 
something interesting that you would like to share with my friends and/or followers. For 
instance, a link to a news item or a video. Sharing a status update could be, among other 
things, endorsing it; agreeing with it; promoting it; and so on. All of these are (existing) 
illocutionary acts. I will return to this in the next chapter, when I categorise speech acts on 
SNS’s. The speech act of sharing cannot be felicitous outside of the SNS’s conventional 
surroundings. If you wanted to perform the same act in a personal conversation with your 
friend, you would not be able to do so. When you are talking to your friend and she says 
something you want to repeat to other people, you cannot say ‘share’. This is a rule that is 
specific to Facebook, in this example. Of course, there are offline acts that resemble Facebook 
sharing. You could repeat her words, but then they become your words and they are no longer 
attached to the original source, your friend. Even if you added that the words are hers, there 
would still be you as the mediator or messenger, and the Facebook share takes you directly to 
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her words or post. Another way would be to have her write down her words and sign her name 
to them. You could then make copies of this document and distribute them among your friends 
and acquaintances. This would be close to Facebook sharing is. But then, the sender is her, not 
you, whereas on Facebook, the person doing the sharing is the sender of the shared status 
update, and the original sender is still the sender of the original status update. So in the 
comparison with the document, you would have to at least add your name to it, or add your 
name plus your own message, for instance, why you are distributing this document – because 
you endorse it, or because you think it is total nonsense. However, since you would have to 
mail or personally hand over the documents, and they will not reach the people at the same 
time, there just is no exact copy of a Facebook share or retweet in real life. It was for this 
reason that, when I did the research for this thesis, I started with the assumption that sharing 
was a new illocutionary act, not covered by Austin’s and Searle’s illocutionary act 
taxonomies. However, the intention to share – which comprises the actual illocutionary act – 
is not something new.  
  
1.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have argued that verbal and written utterances are part of speech act theory, 
as are videos. Furthermore, SNS’s are pervasive enough to regard them as a platform for 
speech acts. Moreover, that surrounding is conventional, just as real-life situations are with 
respect to the performance of speech acts. Therefore, speech on SNS’s is subject to speech act 
theory. In the next chapter, I will rank the SNS’s specific speech acts into the existing 
taxonomies and find that there is a new illocutionary act on SNS’s that is not found in real 
life: hashtagging. 
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Chapter 2: Illocutionary acts on SNS’s 
 
Introduction 
Against the background of illocutionary acts on SNS’s given in the first chapter, in this second 
chapter I will turn to the task of ranking different kinds of illocutionary acts on SNS’s in the 
existing categories of illocutionary acts. As I am not aware of any published work on speech 
act theory related to SNS’s, I will give these classifications as a starting point for further 
discussions. I hope the results will help to define the scope of the subject of illocutionary acts 
on SNS’s and hopefully benefit any future research pursuing this direction. The categories I 
will be using to rank the illocutionary acts on SNS’s are the taxonomies provided by Austin 
(1962) and Searle (197632). The reason to do this categorisation is the following. If I want to 
find out whether SNS’s have introduced new illocutionary acts, it is necessary to have an 
overview of the illocutionary acts on SNS’s and compare them with the pre-SNS’s 
taxonomies. An overview of all possible sorts of illocutionary acts that are specific to SNS’s 
will help to sift out any new illocutionary acts. In chapter one, I preliminarily pointed toward 
the outcome that there may be little or even no difference between online and offline 
illocutionary acts. However, I cannot just make this assumption and then pick out one 
illocutionary act that I argue is new and does not fit into existing speech act theory. That 
would be too random. What I will be doing is describing the different illocutionary acts that 
are possible on SNS’s, and explaining per illocutionary act 1) what it entails, and 2) whether it 
falls within existing speech act theory and why (not). And 3) if the answer to the second 
question is affirmative, then I will rank the type of illocutionary act in Austin’s as well as 
                                                          
32 It may seem as if Searle has written two different articles on the taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In 1975 he 
published the article A taxonomy of illocutionary acts in the book Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages 344-369. A year later, Language in Society printed Searle’s article A 
classification of illocutionary acts. This concerns the same article with some small changes (such as the title), 
based on a lecture that Searle gave at the Summer Linguistics Institute in Buffalo in 1971. I will adhere to the 
1976 article, since this is the most recently revised article. 
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Searle’s taxonomy. For the sake of brevity, I will list only the illocutionary acts that are 
specific for SNS’s, such as sharing, retweeting, @-ing, hashtagging, liking, etcetera. On 
SNS’s, it is of course possible to congratulate someone, or to thank someone, or to promise 
something, but I have not included these illocutionary acts because they differ in no apparent 
or important way from the same illocutionary acts offline. It is because of this task of ranking 
that I had to explore speech acts so extensively in chapter 1.  
It is striking how comprehensive Austin’s and Searle’s taxonomies are, seeing that 
almost every illocutionary act on SNS’s fits in one of their categories. With one exception, 
however. We will come by one illocutionary act on SNS’s that has no counterpart in offline 
speech, or so I argue. The illocutionary act I refer to is hashtagging. A hashtag on a social 
medium is a form of labelling an utterance, so that other users of the same social medium can 
find the utterance. It is my intention to show that hashtagging does not have a place in 
Austin’s and Searle’s taxonomies and that a new sort of illocutionary act needs to be 
established to mark its existence.  
 
2.1 Illocutionary acts on Facebook and Twitter 
boyd and Ellison33 defined social network services (SNS’s) as web-based applications 
allowing three functions: ‘1) users construct a public or semi-public profile; 2) present a list of 
other users to whom an individual is connected; and 3) view and follow that list and the lists 
of others within the system.’34 Most SNS’s are free for the users, and are sustained by 
advertisement income. Since there are many SNS websites, I focus on two of them. When 
                                                          
33 Most scholars in computer-mediated communication take boyd & Ellison’s definition of SNS’s as a starting 
point. 
34 2008, p. 211 
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looking at the top five most- used SNS’s networks35: Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Google+ 
and Instagram, Facebook and Twitter are the most likely candidates for the purpose of my 
thesis. They are both well-known, have a large reach, and are influential in modern day 
society. YouTube and Instagram are video and image based respectively, making them more 
attractive to younger generations. YouTube is by far the most similar to offline speech 
situations. It is essentially a platform for people’s videos; if asked to describe it to someone 
who has never been on the internet but does know television, I would say it is do-it-yourself 
television. Anyone can start her own YouTube channel and upload videos. No subject is 
lacking, it seems: academic subjects, sports, economy, health and fitness, travelling, medicine, 
transportation, doing odd jobs, animals, and many more. People who upload videos on a 
regular basis in which they give what is best described as small lectures, are called ‘vloggers’ 
and their videos are ‘vlogs’ (video-log, cf. blogs: web-logs). There are vlogging doctors, 
lawyers, judges, academics, teenage girls and boys, students, personal trainers, chefs, athletes, 
municipal facility workers, and any other occupation you can think of. One can find tutorials 
or ‘how to’ videos, explanatory videos, support seeking or offering videos, review videos of 
almost any product or appliance available and even vlogs of vloggers watching other vloggers 
on YouTube – this seems to be a favourite teenage pastime at the time of writing this thesis. 
(And giving a new perspective to the question of regression.) Within the subject of 
philosophy, one can find videos ranging from explanations for laypeople – like 3-minute 
philosophy about Hume, Descartes and Plato36 - to MOOC’s (open classes) for BA / MA 
students from sometimes very well-known philosophers37, and it is in this way that lectures 
                                                          
35 http://www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-media-
research/ 
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1awvC1l7mM&list=PLgYuWYisC1bmITLvPX8eEdj9PIj2jPg-g  
37 Harvard University’s Justice by Michael Sandel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-
8hEY&list=PL8E76EB832BA66E75  
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held at universities of recognised standing like Harvard and Oxford become available to 
anyone with a device, worldwide. The question presents itself: if YouTube is so popular, why 
don’t I include it in my research? The answer is that the one thing all of these videos have in 
common, is that they mainly portray ‘regular’ speech situations, comparable to being spoken 
to, or watching television. It is a one-way form of communication (not counting the 
possibility to leave a comment under the video, because this is not incorporated in the actual 
video – you cannot reply or answer in real time) and it is not as accessible a platform as 
Twitter and Facebook are. Instagram is photography-based; an Instagram update consists of a 
photo with or without caption. Posting without a photo is not possible. Google + is very 
similar to Facebook. So, in choosing from the five most popular SNS’s, I have chosen the two 
platforms that offer the most options for textual input, and therefore for illocutionary acts, by 
the users. Also, since most SNS’s websites offer (almost) the same kinds of possibilities to 
their users, by discussing the possibilities that Twitter and Facebook offer, many (if not all) of 
the possibilities on other social networks will also have been discussed. Twitter and Facebook 
can be seen as representatives in this sense. 
First some background information on Twitter. Twitter is a web-based social 
networking site for microblogging that allows registered users to ‘tweet’. It is called 
‘microblogging’ because the distinguishing feature of Twitter is that tweets have a maximum 
of 140 characters. A tweet is a written message on the Twitter platform, available via 
smartphone, tablet, laptop and/or desktop computer.38 Twitter users are people who have 
signed up for a Twitter account, and they can enter the platform with the use of a personalised 
user name and password. On Twitter, the users can unilaterally follow other users and be 
followed by other users on a non-reciprocal basis. This means that a user can follow any other 
                                                          
38 From here on, to avoid repetition of the enumeration, I will refer to the smartphone, tablet, laptop and/or 
desktop computers as ‘devices’. 
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user, and the user being followed does not need to follow back. Although Twitter started out 
as a text-based platform, users are increasingly posting pictures and links to other websites. 
Hashtags originated on Twitter, and I will elaborate on this in the section where I categorise 
Twitter speech acts. Twitter has 328 million monthly active users worldwide39. Facebook has 
1.86 billion monthly active users around the globe40 and the number is rising every year. 
Facebook users create a user profile with information about their professional and personal 
life, much like a CV, as elaborated or scant as they choose it to be. Other people can be added 
as ‘friends’ – this is a reciprocal function for which consent is needed. Users may post status 
updates, which can be purely text-based or include digital photos and/or links. Additionally, 
they may join common-interest user groups – for instance, there is a Spinoza group, in which 
scholars studying Spinoza can contact each other with thoughts, links, news and questions 
about Spinoza’s work. There are work-related groups, illness-related groups, school-related 
groups, etcetera. Facebook and Twitter both provide private messaging services, which I will 
not take into account here. ‘Saying’ something on Facebook is typically called a ‘status 
update’, while a message on Twitter is called a ‘tweet’. 
 In what follows, I will first introduce the illocutionary act taxonomies of Austin and 
Searle. Next, I will make an overview of illocutionary acts on SNS’s that are in any way 
different from illocutionary acts in real life. I will discuss this difference and then assess the 
act as either new or not new. If it is not new, I will rank it within the existing taxonomies. If it 
is new, then I will give the reason why it is new and why it does not fit into the existing 
categories. This will be the case for hashtagging.  
 
2.2 Speech act taxonomies 
                                                          
39 The official Twitter Blog https://about.twitter.com/company 07-21-2017 
40 Facebook Newsroom http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/  
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To be able to categorise the speech acts on SNS’s, it is now time to introduce the two different 
taxonomies of illocutionary verbs by Austin and Searle. I will rank or assign the illocutionary 
acts on SNS’s to existing categories in these taxonomies, where possible. First, Austin’s 
speech act taxonomy: 
Type Examples (tokens) 
 
Verdictives: the giving of a verdict 
 
 
To find, reckon, appraise, hold, rank, assess 
 
Exercitives: the exercising of powers, rights, 
or influence 
 
 
To appoint, order, vote, urge, advise, declare, 
warn, announce, give 
 
Commissives: making a commitment or 
announcing an intention 
 
 
To promise, plan, side with, pledge, guarantee 
 
Behabitives: expressing attitudes (to others), 
social behaviour (derived from ‘behave’) 
 
 
To apologise, congratulate, commend, 
condole, curse, toast, welcome 
 
Expositives: make plain how we use words, 
how utterances are ‘expository’ 
 
 
To reply, argue, concede, assume, postulate, 
affirm, deny, call 
31 
 
Table: Austin’s illocutionary acts categories: ‘classes of utterance, classified according to 
their illocutionary force’, in: How to do things with words, lecture XII p. 151 ff. 
 
Searle takes issue with Austin’s taxonomy on several points. The main reason for him to reject 
Austin’s classification is that ‘there is no clear or consistent principle or set of principles on 
the basis of which the taxonomy is constructed.’41 This leads to a lack of clear-cut distinctions 
and too much overlap between the proposed categories. Searle therefore proposes a different 
taxonomy,42 predominantly based on (1) point (or purpose) of the act, (2) the direction of fit 
between words and the world and (3) expressed psychological states. 43 The illocutionary 
point is the purpose of the speaker making the utterance, and it is part of the illocutionary 
force. An example of (1) is an attempt to get the hearer to do something, as with the 
illocutionary acts of ordering and requesting. By (2), Searle means that illocutionary points 
partly entail making the world fit the words or vice versa. Assertions, for instance, are words 
matching the world. In the utterance ‘It is raining in Leiden’ when it is indeed raining in 
Leiden, the words fit the actual state of the world (cf. Austin’s initial constative). Making the 
world match the words is part of the illocutionary point of promises and requests. If I have 
made a promise to make supper for you and kept my promise, then the world has fitted the 
words (cf. Austin’s initial performative). Now with (3), Searle points towards what an 
illocutionary act is meant to express. An assertion expresses a belief that p; a promise 
expresses an intent to a; an order expresses a desire that X do A, and an apology expresses a 
regret at having done A. What is expressed, respectively belief, intent, desire and regret, are 
                                                          
41 A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 1976, p. 8. It is beyond the scope of my thesis to discuss Searle’s issues 
with Austin’s taxonomy in detail. Searle’s article is suggested for further reading on this topic. 
42 1976, p. 10 ff. 
43 There are nine other dimensions of illocutionary acts that Searle discusses, but he states that the first three 
seem to him “the most important, and I will build most of my taxonomy around them”. (1976 p. 5) 
32 
 
psychological states, according to Searle. Plus, for Searle, psychological states are equivalent 
to sincerity conditions since it is ‘linguistically unacceptable (though not self-contradictory) to 
conjoin the explicit performative verb with the denial of the expressed psychological state’.44 
Sincerity conditions are introduced by him in Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of 
language (1969)45 in which he argues that an insincere promise is still a promise. Even if S 
does not have the intention to keep her promise to a, the mere fact that she makes the promise 
to a means that she takes responsibility for having the intention to a, even if she does not 
intend to a. The way I interpret this is that S knows that the conventional uptake of a promise 
to a is coupled with the intention to a. The conventional uptake will be that a promise to a is 
made sincerely, i.e. with the intention of S to a. Just knowing this, gives S the responsibility 
for invoking the belief that she will a when she promises to a. This responsibility is shown, 
Searle says, by the absurdity of uttering ‘I promise to a but I do not intend to a.46 Even if the 
intention is not there, the responsibility for the intention (and its uptake in the hearer) is. 
Searle concludes from this that the psychological state is the same as the sincerity condition, 
since even if the utterance is insincere, it still falls under S’s responsibility that the hearer 
believes that the promise is sincere; that there is a psychological state of intent. With Searle’s 
three distinctive points explained, we can now turn to Searle’s categorisation of illocutionary 
acts:  
Type:  Examples (tokens) 
Representatives  
Illocutionary point: to commit the speaker to 
something being the case, to the truth of the 
 
To suggest, put forward, state, boast, conclude 
                                                          
44 1976, p. 4 
45 1969, Ch. 3 
46 1969 p. 62 
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expressed proposition. The utterances in this 
class are assessable on the dimension of 
assessment which includes true and false.  
Direction of fit: words-to-world. 
Sincerity condition: belief that p. 
 
Directives  
Illocutionary point: the speaker attempts to 
make the addressee perform an action. 
Direction of fit: world-to-words. 
Sincerity condition: want (wish, desire). 
 
 
To ask, order, request, invite, advise, beg 
Commissives  
Illocutionary point: to commit the speaker to 
doing something in the future. The 
propositional content is always that the 
speaker S does some future action A. 
Direction of fit: world-to-words. 
Sincerity condition: intention. 
 
 
To promise, plan, vow, bet, oppose 
Expressives 
Illocutionary point: to express the 
psychological state or sincerity condition 
regarding a state of affairs (specified in the 
utterance).  
 
To thank, apologise, congratulate, welcome, 
deplore 
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Direction of fit: none. The truth of the 
expressed proposition is presupposed.  
Sincerity condition: a range of different 
possible psychological states. 
 
Declarations  
Illocutionary point: the successful 
performance of a declaration brings about the 
correspondence of the propositional content to 
the world. Declarations bring about some 
alteration in the status or condition of the 
referred-to object(s) in virtue of their 
successful performance (changing the state of 
the world). 
Direction of fit: both world-to-words and 
words-to world. 
Sincerity condition: none. 
 
 
To fire, appoint, nominate, declare, marry 
Table: Searle’s illocutionary acts categories 
I will continue by listing the speech acts on Facebook and Twitter and, where possible, assign 
them to Austin’s and/or Searle’s categories. 
 
2.3 Facebook 
I have already given a short description of the SNS Facebook, but will provide a short 
overview of this platform, specifically focusing on the way one can ‘speak’ on Facebook. 
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When logging on to Facebook, the opening screen shows your timeline.47 This is a vertical 
series of status updates, consisting of a) status updates from friends, b) status updates from 
organisations that you have ‘liked’, c) messages from groups that you have joined, and d) 
some ‘suggested messages’ from advertisers. Facebook friends are made by searching for 
people with the search bar, or by accepting friend invitations from people who have found 
you, or by letting Facebook help you and selecting people from their list of suggestions for 
friends (‘people you may know’) or having Facebook send friend invitations to the contacts in 
your e-mail database. Facebook groups (private or open) are essentially the same as organised 
groups in real life, like book clubs or peer support groups. The landing page of users gives a 
status bar at the top of the screen. In this box, the user can give a status update, and if she 
decides to do that, her status update will appear on her ‘wall’ and can then appear on the 
timeline of her friends. A Facebook wall is the name for the user’s own page, on which she 
can find all of her own status updates in a chronological order. Her friends can respond to her 
status update in two ways: by typing a response (this can include a visual addition such as a 
photo) or by clicking on one of Facebook’s six emoji’s: a like button (the well-known thumbs 
up), a ‘great!’ button (heart), a laughing face (funny), an amazed face, a sad face or an angry 
face.  
The following is a list of the possible speech acts on Facebook and a preliminary 
judgement of the category or categories to which they belong. 
 
1. Status updates (including written responses to other people’s status updates) 
A status update can be anything you could also say in real life. I could upload holiday 
pictures and add a caption with some information, just as I could show the same 
pictures on my smartphone to my friends and tell them the ‘captions’. I could write 
                                                          
47 See addendum: screenshot at the end of this thesis 
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one sentence about how I am struggling with writing my thesis, just as I could call my 
mother and tell her the same thing. I could even just type ‘blah’ if I wanted to, or some 
other nonsensical word. If I see an interesting article on a website, I can put a link to 
that article in the status update box and submit it, with or without my own comment. 
This is the same as me sending an e-mail containing a link to the website. We can 
conclude from these examples that creating a status update equals speaking, and that 
there is no difference with offline speech other than the mode of delivery and the 
audience you can reach. Since status updates equal speech, the things you can say fit 
into the existing illocutionary act categories. Therefore, the full taxonomies of Searle 
and Austin apply. There is no need for an addition to the existing taxonomies. 
Status updates: regular offline taxonomies apply 
 
2. Sharing: when you update your status and the message appears on your wall, then one 
of its features is that there is a button under it saying ‘share’. Other users can click on 
‘share’ and in doing so, create a message on their own walls. For instance, if John had 
made a status update ‘I am having a party tonight’, then Peter (or any of John’s other 
Facebook friends) could click ‘share’ and have the status update appear on his 
(Peter’s) wall. Peter can share this status update with or without his own comment. He 
could just share the message as it is, or add something to it, such as ‘Looking forward 
to a great night!’ In the case of sharing a status update as it is, without further 
comment, the user performs two conventional illocutionary acts. By ‘conventional’ I 
refer to the usual uptake of shared messages on Facebook. The first illocutionary act 
one performs by sharing ‘as it is’ is citing. In sharing something that someone else has 
said, the act of citing is performed. This is not different from citing someone in regular 
media. In citing, one brings attention to something someone else has said. Now, even 
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though a Facebook share is a verbal repetition of someone else’s status update, the 
person doing the sharing is tethered to the quote. If Peter shares John’s status update, 
Peter’s friends on Facebook will see it on their timelines as a message from Peter. 
Because of that link between the person doing the sharing and the shared content – the 
shared content is now ‘uttered’ by the sharer – another illocutionary act is performed, 
and that act is agreeing or endorsing or assenting.48 Agreeing is a complex 
illocutionary act, since it is not a stand-alone act; by definition, it needs someone 
else’s utterance to be felicitous. I will revisit this illocutionary act in chapter 3, when I 
discuss hashtags. Typically, sharing a Facebook status update without any extra 
comment is conventionally taken up as agreement with the content of the status 
update. If one does not agree with the content of the status update that one is sharing, 
one will always make a comment that appears above the shared content. For instance, 
if somebody in John’s group of Facebook friends holds a grudge against John for 
whatever reason, then she could not just share the status update about the party 
without giving the impression to her friends that she likes the party, or is even going to 
attend it. That is just how shares are conventionally taken up. If she is really 
vindictive, she could share the status update and add a comment like: ‘So this will be 
lame. Last place I’d go to tonight.’ But, again, the typical uptake if she was to share it 
without added comment would be as an incentive to join the party. The only exception 
to this conventional uptake might be that someone shares something that is so 
appalling that it can be taken for granted that she is horrified by it, since any normal 
person would be. From this it becomes clear that sharing a message and adding one’s 
own comment is different from sharing without comment. Sharing with comment is a 
combination of citing and a ‘normal’ status update as mentioned under 1). In the 
                                                          
48 these three different acts will for readability purposes fall under the heading ‘agree’ 
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comment, you are free to say what you want about the message you are sharing. You 
can voice your agreement or disagreement, make a quirk about it, add your thoughts 
on the subject, say why you (dis)like the content, and so on. This does not differ from 
voicing your opinion about messages in ‘old’ media like newspapers or comments that 
your friends have made. Also, where illocutionary acts are concerned, sharing with 
comment does not differ from giving your own status update. The shared content is an 
addition to your own message. There is, first, your message, and second, the content of 
the shared message. Therefore, in the case of sharing with comment, there is the 
illocutionary act of citing and the illocutionary act of the regular status update.  
Sharing without comment: expositive (citation) and verdictive (agreement) in Austin. 
Sharing without comment: representative (citation) and declaration (agreement) in 
Searle. 
Sharing with comment: comment can be any speech act, citation is expositive in 
Austin. 
Sharing with comment: comment can be any speech act, citation is representative in 
Searle. 
 
3. Tag: when you create a status update, you can tag people who are connected to or 
involved with the content about which you are creating the status update. For instance, 
if you upload holiday pictures, you can tag people in the pictures. If the people you tag 
accept the tag, then the status update and/or photo will appear on their Facebook wall. 
For instance, Joan uploads a photo of her son’s third birthday party and his uncle Ben 
and aunt Janet are in the picture. Joan then selects Facebook’s tag option, clicks on the 
faces of Ben and Janet and adds their names to their images. Depending on their 
personal settings, the photo will then also appear on Ben’s and Jenny’s Facebook 
39 
 
walls, and can be seen by their Facebook friends on their timelines, even though they 
did not upload the photo themselves. Tagging a person is approximately equivalent to 
indexically pointing someone out to other people offline. For instance, in the example 
given, the offline situation would be that Joan has made a photo-album containing her 
son’s birthday party photos, and she shows the album to other friend, pointing at Ben 
and Janet while saying that they attended the birthday party as well. The main 
difference is that this photo-album will not be automatically in the possession of Ben 
and Janet, while on Facebook, the photo will be added to their online photos. To tag 
someone is to assert their involvement in the activity and/or image, making a tag an 
assertion. But, just like assertions in offline speech, it is something else as well. To tag 
is also to involve someone. The identification part of it, the actual pointing out, is done 
with physical action in real life, but is done with words on SNS’s. Just like the Twitter 
@ (see 2.4.4), the tag is a public message to an individual person. It expresses an 
attitude towards another Facebook user, and it is meant to be received by the 
addressee. 
Tag: expresses an attitude towards someone, so a behabitive in Austin. 
Tag: @ denotes a wish that the addressee receive and take note of the tag, so is a 
directive in Searle. 
 
4. Check in: clicking on the check-in button on your status bar creates a status update of 
your location on your Facebook wall. Examples are: the university library, the local 
swimming pool, the restaurant you visit during your holiday. Some businesses require 
you to check in on Facebook in order to be able to use their Wi-Fi services.  
Location check-in: an announcement, and therefore an exercitive in Austin.  
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Location check-in: a word-to-world assertion on the true/false dimension: 
respresentative in Searle. 
 
5. Likes and emoji’s: Facebook has become famous for its ‘like-button’: an image 
(emoji49) of a thumbs-up.  
 
Facebook like 
‘Liking’ is the most frequently performed illocutionary act on Facebook. It is possible 
to like status updates from friends, messages from companies, organisational pages (if 
you like an organisation, their messages will appear on your timeline from then 
onwards – unless you disable this feature). Clicking the ‘like’ button is an appreciated 
response. It is common for Facebook users to be proud or glad that a message or photo 
they posted received many likes. Liking shows involvement, even though it takes only 
seconds to give a like. Until 2016, the thumbs up button – ‘like’ – was the only emoji 
Facebook provided as a response to a status update, other than typing your own 
response. Sometimes, this would lead to awkward situations: when a friend’s status 
update is about the death of her pet, or failing for an exam, a thumbs-up is not the first 
response you would want to give. Since many of the Facebook users like to scroll 
through the messages on their timeline and just click ‘like’, without having to type a 
response themselves, Facebook introduced five other emoji’s, giving the users more 
options to respond to a status update in one click than a thumbs-up. These emoji’s are: 
                                                          
49 There is some confusion about the term emoji and emoticon. An emoticon is an expression of an emotion in 
a text-only context: :) or :(. An emoji is an actual image of a face, or other things (people holding hands, a 
dancer, a slice of pizza are just a few examples). So with regard to Facebook, we are talking about emoji’s. 
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heart (great), laughing face (funny), stunned face (amazed), teary face (sad), angry 
face (mad). So now, it is equally easy to quickly express these emotions in reaction to 
a status update that is not positive, but sad, or maddening. From this, we can conclude 
that clicking on an emoji is primarily meant to convey an emotion in reaction to a 
status update. 
Likes and emoji’s: social behaviour, therefore a behabitive in Austin. 
Likes and emoji’s: about expressing a psychological state, so an expressive in Searle. 
 
Regarding emoji’s, Dresner and Herring (2010) are of the opinion that 
 
‘in many cases emoticons are not used as signs of emotion, but rather as indications of 
the illocutionary force of the textual utterances that they accompany. As such, they help 
convey the speech act performed through the production of the utterance. These uses 
neither contribute to the propositional content (the locution) of the language used nor 
are they just an extralinguistic [sic] communication channel indicating emotion. Rather, 
they help to convey an important aspect of the linguistic utterance they are attached to: 
What the user intends by what he or she types.’50  
 
Illocutionary force is described by them as ‘illocutionary acts performed through linguistic 
utterances’ and as ‘part of what a speaker means by the utterance, part of what he or she 
intends to convey by making it’. In other words, the authors take the illocutionary force to 
convey the intention of the speaker. They describe a case in which an anxious student makes a 
request and places :) at the end of the request. The student is anxious in making his request 
with a professor, since he is asking for a favour. Therefore, it is unlikely that the smile 
                                                          
50 P. 255 
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represents actual happiness, they state. It is more likely the student is nervous and adds the 
smiley to the request to come across as friendly. The emoticon is placed to ‘modulate an 
already identifiable act’. Another example Dresner and Herring provide is of a woman on a 
forum for fellow sufferers of a disease, on which she has written a litany of complaints with a 
:) at the end of it. The message is clear about the emotional state of the writer, since she 
explicitly states that she has been crying, moping and feeling down. In this case, the authors 
say, ‘the smiley functions to mitigate what otherwise could be read as a self-pitying list of 
complaints.’ Or, in a final example, a complaint can be altered from a ‘rude, selfish gripe’ to a 
‘mild, humorous complaint’ by adding an emoticon. This speaks to intention, Dresner and 
Herring hold, not to emotion. There are two problems with their reasoning, in my view. The 
first is their uptake of what illocutionary force entails. Illocutionary force is identical with the 
speaker’s intention. Utterances are used with a certain kind of illocutionary force; therefore, 
by means of the utterance, an illocutionary act with that illocutionary force is performed. 
Usually, the speaker’s intention and the illocutionary force will overlap, since the intention of 
the speaker determines the illocutionary force. However, this does not make the illocutionary 
force the result of the intention; it is the result of the utterance. Secondly, while I agree that 
emoticons can be used as typographic additions in order to clarify speaker meaning, emoji’s 
can also be used stand alone. Responding with a singular emoji to a status update message on 
Facebook is specifically designed to convey an emotion about the message. If John uploads 
some photos of his party and his Facebook friends like the photos, or press the heart (great) 
button, or the laughing emoji, it is quite clear that they convey their emotions about the photos 
in question: they like them, or they think they are great, or funny. Now, it could of course be 
the case that someone hits the ‘like’ button without sincerely liking the content; maybe 
because of peer pressure, or feigning involvement with the content when it is not felt. Searle’s 
argument about a promise made still being a promise, even though it is not sincere, holds in 
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this case.51 The emoji clicked on is still the responsibility of the person who clicks, since she 
will know the conventional uptake of the emoji, just as the promiser would in Searle’s 
example. There is a difference, however, between the response emoji’s that stand alone (text 
cannot be added), and emoji’s used in status updates. When used in status updates, I concur 
with Dresner and Herring that emoji’s, especially the smiley face, are sometimes used to for 
instance mitigate or soften the message, or to signal an intention of the speaker, and hence 
could be seen as carriers of illocutionary force – if you view illocutionary force as the 
intention of the speaker, as Dresner and Herring do. However, the authors do allow for 
emoticons to be ‘used to express or perform emotion, where the emoticon iconically 
represents an emotional facial expression.’ I believe that this is accurate with regard to the 
Facebook emoji’s, since they are not accompanied by text and therefore are stand-alone ways 
for a speaker to convey a response of emotion to a message. Therefore, I have categorised the 
emoji’s under social behaviour, making them behabitives in Austin and expressives in Searle.  
 Now, we turn to Twitter. 
 
2.4 Twitter 
1. Tweet: Twittering is the same act as writing a status update on Facebook. The only (great) 
difference is that Facebook does not limit the number of characters for a message and a tweet 
contains 140 characters or less. But within that space, any speech act can be performed. So 
tweets would be categorised in the same way utterances in real life are. So, tweets are speech, 
and therefore, the full taxonomies of Searle and Austin apply for the things Twitter users can 
say (cf. Facebook status updates). 
Tweets: regular offline taxonomies apply 
 
                                                          
51 This thesis, p. 30 
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2. Retweet: retweeting is the same act as ‘sharing’ in Facebook, including the possibility to 
retweet with/out one’s own comment, so for its categorisation I refer to that topic. 
 
3. Hashtag: it is not an exaggeration to state that Twitter is ruled by hashtags. An example 
will make this clear. The night of the terrorist attack on civilians in Nice, France on the 
national holiday‘ le quatorze Juilliet’, 2016, two hashtags were trending on Twitter52. They 
were #NicePortesOuvertes and #RechercheNice53. The first hashtag was created to find tweets 
from inhabitants of Nice who opened their homes to people who were not able to reach their 
own home, or who had no roof over their heads, to stay overnight. The second hashtag was 
created to find missing people; to try to get in touch with friends and family who were in Nice 
at the time of the attack but could not be directly contacted or found by their families and 
friends. These two hashtag examples mirror the usefulness and importance of hashtags on 
SNS’s. People who otherwise would have had to sleep on the streets, or in their cars, were 
welcomed by citizens of Nice who generously opened their doors to them. Twitter brought 
them together, via a hashtag. Also, many worrisome nights were prevented by the second 
hashtag, making it easier for people who were separated by hundreds or thousands of miles, to 
find each other. Oftentimes, hashtags play an important part in the role Twitter can assume 
during incidents and crises. It is not a random SNS that is used; it is specifically the hashtag 
function that makes the difference. A hashtag is a sort of label, used to categorise a tweet’s 
topic(s). Twitter users can use hashtags as search criteria in the search box to find tweets with 
the same hashtag. For instance, a search for #NicePortesOuvertes will list all tweets to which 
this hashtag is added, in chronological order. Hashtags are marked by the hash sign: # (better 
                                                          
52 Trending on Twitter means that the hashtag is the most used on Twitter, usually given in a top 5 or 10 of most 
used hashtags.  
53 Even though upper and lower case letters are used here, hashtags are not case-sensitive. 
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known as pound sign in America), followed by a term meant to ‘collect’ tweets that are related 
to the term. One can use just one hashtag or a series of them. By adding a hashtag to a tweet, 
it is ‘named’ or ‘labelled’ – tagged – so that it can be found by people who also want to say 
something about the same topic, or who want to read about it. A tweet without a hashtag will 
appear on the timelines of a Tweep’s54 followers, but will be hard to find by people who are 
not following that person on Twitter. So, if a Tweep wanted her tweets about Hilary Clinton to 
be found by other people during the 2017 American elections, adding #USElections 
#HilaryClinton #Democrats to her message will have made it appear on the pages with tweets 
that are tagged with the same hashtag. An important trait of hashtags is that Twitter users 
create them. Many hashtags have, of course, already been invented, but a hashtag like 
#NicePortesOuvertes did not exist before the incident. Most likely, one Twitter user from Nice 
came up with this hashtag. Other people saw it, started retweeting the tweet and/or making 
their own tweets with this hashtag added, and then it became trending (‘most used’ in Twitter 
jargon). Functionally, the hashtag is a search improver. However, hashtags have many other 
functions that make it difficult to categorise this as one illocutionary speech act. I will argue 
that hashtagging is a meta-speech act (chapter 3). Therefore, no categorisation is provided 
here. 
 
4. At (@): adding an @ to your tweet makes the tweet directed at another Twitter user. For 
example, if one is enthusiastic about the service on board of a Singapore Airlines flight, one 
could tweet something like ‘Arrived fresh and fit after a 12-hour flight, thank you 
@SingaporeAir’. The owner of the Twitter account that is tagged will then receive a 
notification of the tweet. In this case: Singapore Airlines receives a notification, and the tweet 
can be found by all Twitter users who search for Singapore Airlines on Twitter. Essentially, @ 
                                                          
54 Tweeps are people who (avidly) use Twitter. 
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is a public message meant for a specific person or organisation. This is not new, in itself. 
Newspapers, for instance, offer publicists and sometimes readers the possibility to write a 
public message about something. The happy passenger could have sent a letter to her 
newspaper containing her positive review of the flight, or she could go to the airline’s website 
or Google and add her review there. Even though it is not possible in offline communication 
to use the @ sign, there are ways to direct public messages to a specific person or 
organisation. Therefore, the existing taxonomies apply. 
At (@): the sender of the tweet expresses an attitude towards another Twitter user, so this is a 
behabitive in Austin.  
At (@): a directive in Searle, since @ means a wish for the addressee to receive and take note 
of the tweet.  
 
5. URL/link: a link to a website page posted in a tweet makes it possible for the reader of the 
tweet to click on the link and be directed to the website. This may be an article or a video, for 
example. (Not that on Facebook, this function is integrated in the status update.) Usually, 
some comment about the link is made in the tweet. It could read ‘Love this latest insight from 
@HuffingtonPost and then give a link to an article on Huffington Post. The comment part is 
similar to a Facebook status update or a tweet. The function is similar to the Facebook share, 
since a website link can be tweeted with or without comment. Therefore, this act is similar to 
2. sharing on Facebook and I refer to the categorisation in that section (see 2.3.2). 
 
6. Embed tweet: tweets can be embedded on websites and blogs. An embedded tweet is a 
fully functional tweet – including hashtags, @’s, links, photos, videos – taken out of the 
Twitter context and put into the context of regular websites or blog sites. In a way, it is like 
making a screen shot of a tweet and placing a fully functional copy of it on a website, which 
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makes it a copy-paste action. This, too, can be seen as a form of citation. It is taking literally 
what someone has said on Twitter and repeating it on a website or blog. Citing has already 
been treated in 2. sharing on Facebook, so I refer to the categorisation found there (2.3.2). 
 
7. Favourite: originally designed to place tweets in a folder so they can be reread at will, the 
Twitter favourite is more commonly used as a ‘like’ button. When clicking on favourite, the 
favoured tweet will go into a (public) folder in the account of the Twitter user who clicked on 
it, and will be saved there. Other Twitter users can access this folder and see which tweets 
were liked by a specific Tweep. Furthermore, the Tweep who posted the tweet will see that 
her tweet was ‘favoured’ and by whom. In the last instance, the Twitter favourite is similar to 
the Facebook like. I already established in the Facebook section that likes are behabitives in 
Austin, and expressives in Searle. The folder function however is an act of ranking, but this 
act is not performed by the Twitter user. It is a function of the SNS Twitter. Therefore, the 
folder function cannot be judged to be an illocutionary act by the Twitter user.  
 
Twitter favourite 
 
2.5 Table of illocutionary acts on Facebook and Twitter 
The table below recapitulates the categorisations I have given of the illocutionary acts found 
on Facebook and Twitter: 
Facebook Twitter Austin Searle 
Status update Tweet All speech acts All speech acts 
Sharing with 
comment 
Retweeting with 
comment & 
embed tweet & 
URL/link 
Expositive (citation) and 
verdictive (agreement) 
Representative (citation) 
and declaration 
(agreement) 
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Sharing without 
comment 
Retweeting 
without 
comment & 
embed tweet & 
URL/link 
Comment can be any 
speech act, quote/citation 
is expositive 
Comment can be any 
speech act, quote/citation 
is representative 
- Hashtag - - 
Check-in - Exercitive 
(announcement) 
Representative 
(announcement) 
Likes/emoji’s Favourite Behabitive Expressive 
Tag @ Behabitive (expression 
of attitude) 
Directive (intent of 
receipt by addressee) 
 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have introduced the SNS platforms Twitter and Facebook and have given 
arguments for my choice of these two SNS’s for the purposes of this thesis. Furthermore, I 
have ranked the different illocutionary speech acts on Twitter and Facebook. I have argued 
that almost all illocutionary acts are not new, and can be subsumed in the existing 
illocutionary act taxonomies of Austin and Searle. There is, however, one illocutionary act 
that cannot be subsumed in those and that is hashtagging. In the following chapter I will 
provide my arguments for this point of view and argue that hashtagging is a meta-speech act. 
Also, I will discuss some possible objections. 
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Chapter 3: How to do things with hashtags 
Introduction 
On Twitter, filling out #speechacts in the search bar results in a long list of tweets of people 
who have used this hashtag with their tweet. #illocutionaryacts only yields two results, so this 
is not a hotly debated topic on Twitter. What boggles my mind somewhat is that there is a 
hashtag #hashtag as well, yielding an extended list of results. Which means that there are 
people categorising their tweet by giving it a label that is the label of what they are doing with 
the label. Again, the question of regression rises. Or does this already point towards the 
exceptionality of the illocutionary act of hashtagging? The linguistic definition of ‘hashtag’ is 
‘a word or phrase preceded by the symbol # that classifies or categorises the accompanying 
text (such as a tweet)’.55 In the previous chapter, I stated that all illocutionary acts on Twitter 
and Facebook have a place in the existing illocutionary act taxonomies of Austin and Searle, 
except for the hashtag. But if the hashtag is simply a ‘label’, this would equal the giving of a 
verdict for Austin, similar to an act like ranking, making it a verdictive in Austin’s taxonomy. 
Somewhat less apparent in Searle, but plausible nonetheless, would be to argue that a hashtag 
changes the state of the world, at least the state of the Twitter world, so that it could be a 
declarative in his taxonomy. There is nothing new about that. So, why do I argue that 
hashtagging is a new speech act? The short answer is that the linguistic definition falls short, 
and that there is more to the act of hashtagging than classification, and that it does not touch 
the philosophical aspects of this speech act. Hashtagging appears to be doing much more than 
categorising accompanying text: one can create new hashtags, thus creating a category; but it 
can also be used to constitute a social group, or as a mark of distinction. So, you would be 
hard-pressed to find one category in Austin’s or Searle’s taxonomy that covers this range. 
Searle’s declarative does not completely cover the act of hashtagging either, since even 
                                                          
55 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hashtag  
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though hashtags have both world-to-word and word-to-world fit, they do not always change 
the state of the world. It is definitely not in the same category of illocutionary verbs as to fire, 
to marry or to appoint. The question rises what type of illocutionary act hashtagging is – if it 
is an illocutionary act at all? I will argue that it is an illocutionary act, but that it is cannot be 
categorised like the other illocutionary acts on SNS’s. There are many different uses, which 
leads me to the thought that hashtagging does not have one essence or definition, but has 
many uses, some of which overlapping; and this brings to mind Ludwig Wittgenstein’s family 
resemblance. I will discuss this possibility, but choose to define hashtagging as a meta-speech 
act. 
Hashtagging has no counterpart in offline speech, yet is so influential, that it has made 
its way into offline speech as a new speech act, for instance in advertisements and in regular 
media. Take, for instance, radio programmes. In the majority of these, the host will at some 
point say something like: ‘Listeners can react to our topics and guests, use hashtag News on 
One’. The act of hashtagging is certainly doing something with words, but ‘to hashtag’ is not 
an explicit illocutionary verb. The provisional litmus test of ‘hereby’ fails: ‘I hereby hashtag’ 
is nonsensical. Moreover, the hashtag can be added to an utterance that is already an 
illocutionary act; it can be added to a promise, for instance, or an assertion. To perform the 
speech act of hashtagging, there has to be another speech act that is hashtagged, which 
triggers the idea that it is a meta-speech act.  
These are the topics of this last chapter: 1) the uses of the hashtag and the types of 
illocutionary acts they can be, 2) the possibility of hashtagging not having a single essence but 
being a term of family resemblance, and 3) the idea of the hashtag as a meta-speech act. 
 
3.1 The uses of hashtags 
There are different things that using a hashtag can achieve. You can: 
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1. make your tweet56 easier to find; 
2. create a new category; 
3. stand out (e.g. by giving a jocular twist to your tweet); 
4. join in; 
5. give your opinion; 
6. make sure your speech act reaches more people; 
7. show you are part of some social construct. 
And maybe there are even more uses, but for now, I will focus on these seven. The first use is 
the intended or the ‘official’ use – the reason the hashtag was invented.57 If you are following 
the national elections, it would be hard to find all the tweets about this topic without a 
common label. So the first use of the hashtag is as a label. The second use, creating a new 
category, is applicable when someone coins a hashtag for a topic. I did that for 
#locutionaryact on Twitter (see below). Some hashtags become quite famous, in the sense that 
they are trending on a regular basis, such as #TGIF (Thank God It’s Friday). The third use is 
related to the second and is best explained by giving an example. The philosopher and 
political scientist Eric Schliesser is one of the few philosophers who have embraced social 
media. Schliesser is a prominent social media presence, maintaining a blog and very active 
Twitter and Facebook accounts.58 He regularly adds original hashtags to his tweets and 
Facebook posts that are not meant in the first place as a tool to find the messages. Examples 
are #deepthoughtswhilegradingpapers and 
#publishingabookisweirdmaybeishoulddoitmoreoften. Clicking on these hashtags will give a 
very short search result: just the messages of Schliesser are listed. This points towards the use 
                                                          
56 I talk here about tweets, but this pertains to all SNS’s that have hashtags as a function, including Instagram 
and Facebook  
57 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hashtag  
58 Blog: digressionsimpressions.typepad.com 
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of the hashtag as an illustration or emphasis, or maybe in a way similar to a thought cloud as 
used in cartoons. Of course, hashtags can also be used to join a group (use 4); this is often 
seen on Instagram. Being favoured by teens and tweens, this image-based SNS is more about 
appearances than it is about news (as Twitter is). For instance, food, fitness, and sports are big 
issues on this SNS. One of the trends within these topics is ‘clean eating’, which entails 
avoiding processed and packaged foods as much as possible and only eating ‘whole’ foods, 
either plant-based or including animal products. The hashtag #cleaneating results in 
32.889.507 public messages (August 17, 2017), consisting mostly of images of healthy meals 
and fit physiques. Using this hashtag shows that the user joins or underwrites this lifestyle, at 
least when seen as the serious literal utterances that I assume for this thesis. The fifth use of 
hashtags is to give an opinion: #impeachTrump and  #getridofISIS being some examples. 
Furthermore, hashtags can be used to reach as many people as possible by placing the 
message in as many categories as possible, by using many hashtags (sixth use). This would be 
harder on Twitter, given the limited characters allowed in a tweet, but some Instagram photos 
are followed by a long list of hashtags, sometimes thirty or more. The hashtags do not 
necessarily have to be related to the image or message. (Maybe it is helpful to think of this as 
hashtag ‘spamming’.). Seventh, hashtags can show that you are part of some sort of social 
construct. Using the Twitter hashtag #leidenuniversity shows a connection between the Tweep 
and the university, and also (as an overlapping function) using the aforementioned hashtag 
#cleaneating will show you as part of the group of people who feel it is important to eat 
healthily.  
The common denominator of hashtags is that they have to be linked to another speech 
act. As part of my empirical research for this thesis, I looked up the hashtags 
#illocutionaryact, #perlocutionaryact and #locutionaryact on Twitter (August 17, 2017) and 
the latter did not yield any results; it did not exist yet. So first, I tried to make the category 
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#locutionaryact without adding another utterance, but that was not possible. A hashtag can 
only accompany another speech act. So, I wrote a tweet and added the hashtag 
#locutionaryact, creating a new category: 
 
The outcome is that a hashtag can only be used together with another speech act. I needed to 
write down an utterance to be able to add a hashtag to it. I will return to this later in this 
chapter. 
In answering the question whether hashtagging is an illocutionary act, the first 
noticeable thing is that Austin’s provisional ‘hereby’ litmus test appears to fail. Since, while it 
is quite possible to utter ‘I hereby assert’, uttering ‘I hereby hashtag’ seems nonsensical. 
However, this may have to do with the fact that hashtagging is ipso facto a written speech act, 
since it is not possible to hashtag speech outside of SNS’s. How is a written speech act 
different? To answer this, let me compare the hashtag to a written promise. Assume that John 
lives in Peter’s neighbourhood, and instead of giving his verbal promise to Peter that he will 
attend his party, John decides to write a note and deliver it in Peter’s mailbox on his way to 
work. So, John writes ‘You can count on me tonight. Looking forward to seeing you later.’. 
Obviously, John has performed the illocutionary act of promising with his note. But wouldn’t 
it be nonsensical to apply ‘I hereby promise’ to the writing of the note? Even if John were to 
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think ‘I hereby promise’ while writing the note, that would be odd – to say the least. So, the 
illocutionary act of promising is performed but does not meet the hereby test. It is possible to 
conclude from this that the hereby test fails to sift out all illocutionary acts. However, it still is 
apt for utterances in the first person singular, present tense. It is the writing that makes the test 
fail for written illocutionary acts. Then again, passing the hereby test is not sufficient (and 
maybe not even necessary) to prove that hashtagging is an illocutionary act. The questions 
that need be answered positively to establish the illocutionary character of the act are: is 
hashtagging a speech act and does it result in an internal product? Hashtagging is an act with 
words; in hashtagging, a hashtag is (per)formed. In this sense, the act is equal to asserting and 
the resulting assertion, or marrying and the resulting marriage. Hashtagging results in a 
hashtag; its internal product is the hashtag made. Therefore, hashtagging is an illocutionary 
act. Against this position, one might say that hashtagging is about its result. One might say 
that adding a hashtag is done with the intention of ‘labeling’, or categorising, the tweet. What 
one wants to achieve, then is that the tweet can be found by other Twitter users. Therefore, the 
opposing voice may argue, one is after the effect of the act of hashtagging; one wants her/his 
tweet to be found. Could it not be, then, that hashtagging is a perlocutionary act – and not an 
illocutionary act? My answer to that objection is negative. In Austin’s example, the words 
‘Shoot her!’, are linked to three acts: locutionary (the utterance), illocutionary (the order) and 
perlocutionary (the effect). Just as is the case with ‘Shoot her!’, hashtagging has a locutionary, 
an illocutionary and a perlocutionary aspect. When a person is found through the use of 
#RechercheNice, the adding of the hashtag is not a perlocutionary act. The finding of the 
person is the result, so by adding the hashtag #RechercheNice, the tweet can be found by 
other users who use that hashtag in the search bar, and a perlocutionary act is performed. But 
the hashtagging itself is an illocutionary act, different from the effect in the same way as in 
Austin’s example of ‘Shoot her!’. The illocutionary act will have been performed by adding 
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#RechercheNice, regardless of the effect; even if there is a technical glitch and the tweet is not 
listed under the hashtag. Intending to find someone determines the illocutionary force here.  
 
3.2 Hashtagging as characterised by family resemblance 
In chapter 2, I have been categorising the different illocutionary acts on SNS’s. The process of 
this categorisation consisted of looking at the function(ality) of the acts on Twitter and 
Facebook and then trying to reduce them to their central illocutionary force. One might say 
that I searched their essence and categorised them according to it. But then, I ran into some 
complications when I tried to reduce hashtagging to one unequivocal essence. There are so 
many functions of the hashtag (we have not even touched upon the functions of the sign ‘#’ 
itself; on the telephone, on number pads) and they are in some ways similar: the uses share 
some traits, and miss others. This brings to mind Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Familienähnlichkeit 
(family resemblance) in Philosophische Untersuchungen: 
 
‘We see a complex network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes 
overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. I can think of no better expression 
to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.’ (PU § 66-67) 59 
 
Wittgenstein is arguing that not all words in a language can be reduced to one essence or 
(Platonic) idea. A famous example that he uses is that of Spiel (game). Many things are called  
                                                          
59 ‘Wir sehen ein kompliziertes Nerz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten in 
Großen und Kleinen. (67) Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren, als durch das Wort 
>>Familienähnlichkeiten<<; denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die 
zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszuge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. 
etc.’ Wittgenstein, PU, 1953 
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‘game’: board games, card games, Olympic games. Wittgenstein opposes the idea that for 
games to be called ‘games’, they necessarily have one same trait in common; this trait would 
be their essence. This is not true, says Wittgenstein. Not all games require skill, not all of 
them have a competitive aspect, not all of them are rule-governed, and not all of them are 
physical. For every use of the word game, Wittgenstein says, some traits are shared with other 
uses and some are not. The various different uses of game ‘bilden eine Familie’ (form a 
family). Wittgenstein adds that an analogy can be made between games and language.60 
Sometimes we just throw a ball around playfully, not following any rules, or even making 
them up as we go along. Some terms may not follow the ‘rules’ of their ‘essence’, but have a 
more diverse application. The hashtag seems to fit the description of family resemblance term. 
It started out as a label, but we found new ways of using them as we went along. The ways in 
which we use them are overlapping and criss-crossing at some times, but are used singularly 
at other times. All different uses are illocutionary acts, since with every hashtag, an act is 
performed. But it differs from other illocutionary acts on SNS’s in that it cannot be 
categorised like other illocutionary acts on SNS’s. Therefore, it may be explained as 
characterised by family resemblance.  
 This characterisation, however, may be problematic. One could argue that calling 
hashtagging a family resemblance term is a categorisation in and of itself. It is categorising 
the hashtag as falling under family resemblances. My reply to this is that it was not 
Wittgenstein’s intention to invent a family resemblance theory, since that would be opposite to 
his refutation of general theories. He nowhere states anything of a dogmatic or theoretic sort; 
in fact, his writing style of aphorisms is a rejection of dogmatic reasoning in itself. It is not, as 
some authors have defended, a doctrine for all language, since that would be the 
generalisation that Wittgenstein opposes in the first place. A second possible objection is that 
                                                          
60 Wittgenstein, PU 83 & 84 
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while hashtags may have different functions, each function in itself can be categorised in the 
existing taxonomies. For instance, labelling is a form of ranking, which makes it a verdictive 
in Austin’s book. While this is true, and it is possible to assign a category to every use of the 
hashtag, that would be the same as categorising them as seven different illocutionary acts. So 
why are they then all called hashtags, and performed in the same fashion? Is that just a 
coincidence? Pulling the term apart like this would be equivalent to saying that each notion of 
the term ‘game’ can be categorised and that hence, there is no family resemblance to speak of. 
It is a fallacy of composition. If you see the whole, it is clear that the single word ‘game’ has 
many different traits, and the same applies to the word ‘hashtag’. A third, possible objection is 
that unlike the word Spiel, there is one thing that all hashtags have in common: their 
application, namely that they have to be added to another speech act. While this is true in the 
current set-up of the SNS’s, it is not obvious that there could never be a possibility to use a 
hashtag without another speech act. In theory, it would be possible for SNS’s to allow users to 
create a hashtag and not add anything else to it. In my previous example of #locutionaryact, if 
the Twitter application had allowed it, I would have created this hashtag without adding other 
text. Just because it is not possible in the current technical settings of Twitter, does not mean 
that it could not be done at all. There is the technical possibility that not all hashtags have to 
be added to other utterances, and therefore, it is not necessarily the case that all hashtags have 
at least one thing in common.  
 However, I have my own objection against stating that hashtagging is a family 
resemblance term. I find it problematic to on the one hand, give categorisations for 
illocutionary acts on SNS’s as I did in chapter 2, but to, on the other hand, seek refuge in a 
non-essentialist reply as soon as a term does not fit into any taxonomy. Of course, as I already 
stated, there is no dogma in Wittgenstein’s family resemblance, so it is not the case that I have 
to choose between either categorisation or family resemblance. Family resemblance is a 
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pluralistic view in that one hashtag can be different illocutionary acts, and I feel that it would 
be too hasty to assume that there is no monistic explanation for the illocutionary act of 
hashtagging. In my opinion, I have not yet exhausted the possibilities to define what 
hashtagging is or might be. So, in the next paragraph, I will look at another possible 
explanation. 
 
3.3 Hashtagging as a meta-speech act 
In the previous paragraph, I argued that it is theoretically possible to use a hashtag on an SNS 
without adding another utterance. In reality, though, this is not possible. In its everyday use, 
the hashtag is always connected or tethered to another utterance. Hashtagging is something 
you do with words, that has a certain illocutionary force, and the hashtag is performed to or 
about or with another speech act. The hashtag is added to the speech act. So, there is an 
original speech act, upon which another speech act is performed. In that sense, we could say 
that hashtagging is a meta-speech act. ‘Meta’ can be taken up as related to the use of the word 
in ‘meta-analysis’. Just as a meta-analysis is an analysis of other analyses, a meta-speech act 
is a speech act performed on other speech acts. One of the first appearances of the prefix 
‘meta’ is found in Quine’s article Logic based on Inclusion and Abstraction (1937). Quine 
proposes a ‘meta-theorem’ in the article. It is one of the earliest uses of ‘meta’ meaning ‘an X 
about X’. Earlier use of the prefix did not necessarily mean ‘an X about X’ since meta in (for 
instance) metaphysics entails ‘a Y about X’. The hashtag, to be sure, is an X about X. It is a 
speech act about a speech act. More specifically, it is an illocutionary act about a speech act – 
but an illocutionary act is a type of speech act, so ‘X about X’ still stands. To be complete, I 
need to add as a side note that research into the existence of meta-speech acts yielded one 
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earlier description of meta-speech act from Cohen and Krifka61, who defined a meta-speech 
act as   
 
‘operators that do not express a speech act, but a willingness to make or refrain from 
making a certain speech act. The classic example is speech act denegation, e.g. I don’t 
promise to come, where the speaker is explicitly refraining from performing the speech 
act of promising. What denegations do is to delimit the future development of 
conversation, that is, they delimit future admissible speech acts. Hence we call them 
meta-speech acts. They are not moves in a game, but rather commitments to behave in 
certain ways in the future.’ (2011, p. 1) 
 
This description, however, is different from the usual use of the term ‘meta’. For instance, in 
ICT, the term metadata is very common and means ‘data about data’. In academics, a meta-
study about topic Y is a study of several studies about Y. Therefore, I will follow Quine’s use 
of meta-speech act, with meta meaning ‘an X about X’. 
Now, what are the consequences if we view hashtagging as a meta-speech act? It 
seems to me that to answer this question in the best possible way, we need to investigate if a 
meta-speech act is a new phenomenon. Has the emergence of SNS’s created this meta-speech 
act, or were meta-speech acts already common before the existence social media platforms? 
The first sign that the meta-speech act is a new speech act, is that it is hard to find examples in 
offline speech, in which a verbal speech act is accompanied by a meta-speech act in a fashion 
comparable to the use of hashtags. If I perform an illocutionary act, such as an assertion, or a 
promise, or give an order, any speech act that follows the initial speech act is simply a new, 
consecutive speech act. For instance, when I utter ‘The new season of The Bridge will be on 
                                                          
61 Cohen, Ariel and Krifka, Manfred, 2011, p. 1 
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Netflix today’, followed by ‘I’m really excited about this’, then (the content of) my second 
assertion is about (the content of) my first assertion, but it is not a speech act about a speech 
act. The second utterance is not a meta-speech act but rather a consecutive speech act. The 
tweet, however, ‘The new season of The Bridge will be on Netflix today #TheBridge 
#excited’ couples the hashtag to the assertion. It belongs to the tweet; and from the moment it 
is posted, it can be found by searching with the hashtag #excited. That is different from 
uttering two speech acts consecutively. I believe that there is no speech act equal or even 
similar to hashtagging in offline speech; it is a unique illocutionary act. Even the offline 
illocutionary of agreeing, which I promised to revisit62, does not compare. Agreeing is a 
complex illocutionary act since it requires another speech act to be felicitous. Even though it 
is possible to agree with nothing, that would be moot. Agreeing is typically done with an 
utterance made by another. So, there is utterance X by speaker A, and speaker B agrees with 
the utterance X (or not) and utters a sentence to that effect. One could say that this makes 
agreeing a meta-speech act; it is an illocutionary act about another illocutionary act. Yet it is 
still different from the use of the hashtag. In the case of agreeing, the first illocutionary act is 
by speaker A and the second by speaker B. In the case of hashtagging, the first and second 
illocutionary acts are performed simultaneously by the same speaker. Moreover, the 
agreement of speaker B pertains to the content of speaker A’s utterance X, whereas the 
hashtag could – but does not have to – pertain to the content of the utterance, and it will be 
classifying the tweet at the same time, and in doing so, performing an added illocutionary act. 
Therefore, my conclusion is that the way in which the hashtag is ‘meta’ is not found in offline, 
verbal speech. The meta-speech act is a new type of speech act that was created by the 
emergence of social media. 
 
                                                          
62 Chapter 2, the discussion of the speech act of ‘sharing’ on Facebook 
61 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The question of this chapter was to unpick the illocutionary act of hashtagging and to see how 
it can be characterised. Although it is certainly a defendable position to contend that 
hashtagging is characterised by family resemblance, I prefer the notion of meta-speech act for 
this illocutionary act. The reason to choose the meta-speech act is that I think the family 
resemblance description is too broad for hashtags. In my opinion, the meta-speech act 
description fits better, since the hashtag is always a meta-speech act; this may in some sense 
be called its ‘essence’. So, my conclusion is that hashtagging is a new illocutionary act and a 
new phenomenon, the complete reach of which we have not yet seen. I see it as deserving of 
its own place in speech act theory. This conclusion is supported by the fact that hashtags are 
increasingly making their way into verbal, offline speech, for instance in advertisements. It is 
also not unthinkable that at some point, people will actually verbally utter some sort of 
hashtag when they are speaking. I have not heard this happen yet, but if young children ask 
you to ring their doorbell as a ‘like’ for their drawing, it is not far-fetched to think of them as 
at some point saying ‘Dad, may I have a chocolate? Hashtag candy rules.’ Especially when we 
are further ahead in time and ‘dad’ is the boy who made the chalk drawing on the pavement to 
begin with.  
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